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Abstract: The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks forced Germany to face a number of questions. One of them is determining the 
proper level of German political and military support for the USA in their war against terrorism. For Germany, i.e. for a 
country, whose foreign and security policies relies on the strategy of civilian power, it is a greater problem than in the case of 
other countries. American military operations in the fight against international terrorism take place in the context of a nation’s 
right to individual and collective self-defence. Despite this, the extent to which German participation in these operations is 
compatible with the policy of a civil power remains unclear. Most of the attributes of a military operation led by a civilian power 
are present – but not all of them. The main problem is the impossibility of assessing the degree of violence used by German 
soldiers within Operation Enduring Freedom. However, the findings we have obtained so far do not imply that the German 
military support of the U.S.A. contradicts a priori the policy expected from a civilian power.  
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1. Introduction 
 After the reunification in 1990 and considerable changes in the international security 
environment, very extensive discussions have been led in Germany among the security 
community, political elites and public about the country’s new role in the world. As a part of 
these discussions, the role of Germany has been described with many theoretical concepts; 
nonetheless, they often suffer from insufficient elaboration. In this respect, Germany is often 
mentioned as a mid-size power (Mittelmacht – Wilfriered von Bredow), regional power 
(Regionalmacht – Arnulf Baring), central power in Europe (Zentralmacht in Europa – Hans-
Peter Schwarz), leading power (Führungsmacht – Helga Haftendorn), world’s economic power 
(Weltwirtschaftsmacht – Norbert Kloten), European hegemony (Euro-Hegemon – Reinhard 
Rode), commercial state (Handelsstaat – Volker Rittberger), superpower (Großmacht – Peter 
Schlotter), hegemonic power (Hegemonialmacht – Caroline Thomas and Klaus-Peter Weiner), or 
                                                 
1 The author works as an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies of 
the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University. Address: FSS MU, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno, The Czech Republic; 
e-mail: Kriz.Zdenek@seznam.cz. 
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world-power (Weltmacht – Christian Hacke) (Frenkler – Harnisch – Kirste – Maull – Wallraf 
1997: 16).  
In specialised literature, German foreign and security policy is often referred to with a 
theoretical concept of civilian power. Under the Red-Green Coalition’s administration, German 
military engagement abroad had grown; as a result of that, an interesting research matter has 
arisen, i.e. whether the German foreign and security policies remain within the concept of civilian 
power. The presented article deals with the question of whether the German participation in the 
war against international terrorism is or is not in contradiction with the policy anticipated from 
civilian power.  
 
2. Theoretical Concept of Civilian Power  
The theoretical concept of civilian power (Zivilmachtkonzept) is often used in specialised 
literature in relation to the analysis of German and Japanese foreign and security policies. Several 
authors have dealt with its elaboration and application, the most prominent ones are Hanns W. 
Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, Knut Kirste and Dieter Senghaas.  
Promoters of the civilian power concept suggest revising of the whole paradigm of 
viewing the foreign policy, international relations and security; according to them, it is over-
affected by realism and neo-realism. Allegedly, traditional realistic notions such as national state, 
sovereignty, power, system anarchy, national interest and others no longer conform to the new 
conditions. According to Hanns W. Maull „... all such notions and preliminary conditions appear to be 
dubious in the light of the changed circumstances in the international policy and at the same time entitled to be re-
evaluated, as well as political strategies of national security policy derived from them, such as balance of power, 
withholding and deterring. In brief: we need new thinking in foreign policy.“ (Maull 1992: 772)    
Theoretical roots of the concept of civilian power go back to 1930s. The concept of 
civilian power relates to the name and works of Norbert Elias, a sociologist, who drew up an 
evolutionary sociologist theory about the civilising process (Elias 1997a, Elias 1997b). Elias’s 
theory of the origin of civilisation was modified and transferred into the field of international 
relations by numerous German authors, such as Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, Knut 
Kirste and Dieter Senghaas. Generally, it is assumed that Elias’s theory has not been surpassed, 
even though there have been heated sociological discussions about it (see Vogt 1996).  
According to Maull’s interpretation of Elias’s work, civilising society and politics involves 
following characteristic features: 1. developing procedures of division of labour and 
specialisation, 2. restricting tendencies toward organised social violence via a central institution, 3. 
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forming and reinforcing general mandatory statutes and norms and thus enabling legal control of 
social and political processes, 4. developing democratic political structures permitting 
participation, 5. restricting spreading of conflicts and their regulation in order to minimise 
violence, and 6. efforts to balance economic and social differences within social space based on 
solidarity. According to Maull, the pace of civilising in individual societies varies and thus 
enforcing such tendencies in the international relations system is typical predominantly for 
countries where the civilising process advanced the furthest, i.e. Western Europe, Scandinavia 
and North America (Maull 1992: 772 – 773; cf. Maull 1993: 119). 
In determining optimal foreign policy conduct of civilian power, Elias is interpreted in a 
similar, yet not identical way, by Knut Kirste; in doing so, he concurrently outlines general 
features of the civilising process. In his work, „Rollentheorie und Außenpolitikanalyse“, he states 
that civilian power has the following characteristics: 1. constraining violence organised by state in 
national and trans-national conflicts, 2. improving regulation of international relations in 
international law, 3. strengthening multilateral cooperation and forming participative decision-
making processes in general legitimacy of  the international order that rests upon fundamental 
values of freedom, democracy and free market economy, 4. supporting social equality and justice 
on a global level, 5. enforcing establishment of institutions for control and reinforcement of 
general norms in combination with the willingness to a partial transfer of sovereignty, and 6. 
settling conflicts via special principles and procedures for using military force (Kirste 1998: 49 – 
50).  
According to Dieter Senghaas and his „civilisation hexagon“, via which he interprets 
Elias, the civilising process of the society contains endeavours to accomplish six interconnected 
objectives: 1. establishing monopoly for using violence, 2. controlling monopoly of using 
violence within a legally consistent state, 3. democratic participation, 4. creating culture for 
conflict-solving, 5. installing social justice, and 6. developing mutual dependence of society 
members and controlling their affects (Senghaas 1994: 26). Senghaas claims that international 
policy should also be civilised by means of civilian power in these intentions, at first on a regional 
and later on a global level (Senghaas 1994: 34 – 36). A crucial pre-step is to establish a “security 
community” between states that will eradicate the traditional security dilemma. Naturally, the 
author is aware of the intricacy of such a process as well as its difficult feasibility at a global level. 
However, accomplishing this objective is reasonable at a regional level. As a pre-image, we should 
take the European integration process described by Senghaas under the heading of Maastricht 
Treaty as a „pluralistic security community“ (Senghaas 1994: 37 – 38). 
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The theoretical conception of civilian power is an application of Elias’s civilisation theory 
in the international relations research; with his interpretation of Elias, he belongs to the 
constructionist movement. Civilian power as a state does not mean an a priori rejection of 
military force in implementing one’s own foreign and security policy based on norms and values; 
under certain conditions, it can use armed forces. On grounds of the theoretical conception of 
civilian power, as it is was elaborated at the time of the origin of this work by Maull, Kirst, 
Harnisch, Senghaas and others, it is possible to assume that civilian power is characterised by the 
following attributes by using military forces: 1. military force is the ultimate means of solving a 
conflict after the exhaustion of all non-military possibilities, 2. civilian power plays an active role 
in solving the crisis and military devices serve as a support to non-military devices, 3. military 
operation absolutely complies to international law, 4. military operation aims at supporting and 
defending human rights, 5. while using military force, it is strived to reduce damages and losses 
not only on one’s own side but also on the opponent’s side, and 6. military action takes place in a 
multinational framework (with possible exception of self defence) and is not a tool of a unilateral 
policy.  
When examining whether the German military engagement in the fight against 
international terrorism is compatible with a policy expected from a civilian power, it is essential to 
answer the question of whether these attributes of using a military force are present here.   
 
3. German Involvement in Military Operations in the Fight against International 
Terrorism  
The United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom under Article 51 of UN Chart, 
which grants states the right of collective or individual self-defence. Moreover, United Nations 
Security Council expressed its clear viewpoint in its resolutions N. 1368 and 1373 and appealed to 
its member states to bring to justice all persons who planned, organised and funded these 
terrorist attacks.2 After the Taliban refused to, after a series of open American appeals (see 
Murphy 2002: 243 – 244) as well as informal meetings, extradite Bin Laden, who is held 
responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks, and after they replied that he is not under the 
                                                 
2 In this respect, it is more than clear that UN General Assembly has not classified these actions as an attack and it 
has called for an international cooperation to punish the perpetrators (Murphy 2002: 244). It is a question for further 
research to what extent this phenomenon was caused by the character of UN which is, under the application of strict 
criteria of democracy, an organisation of a major participation of non-democratic states which use it as a tool of their 
own policies. 
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Taliban control, the George Bush Jr. administration decided to destroy the Afghan regime as a 
part of its right of individual or collective self-defence. The military operation started on October 
7, 2001 and was called Enduring Freedom. The American military strategy in Afghanistan was 
aimed at supporting enemies of the Taliban via air-strikes on its positions, training fighters from 
groups hostile to the Taliban and deploying several thousands of soldiers of special units directly 
to Afghanistan. As opposed to the war against Hussein’s Iraq, the objective of this American 
operation was not to establish democracy in the country. American administration was well aware 
of the situation in Afghanistan, which had become one of the most backward countries on earth, 
absolutely unsuitable for a successful import of democracy, due to the Soviet occupation as well 
as the subsequent civil war. The American policy against Afghanistan may be interpreted in such 
a way that the aim of the USA was to destroy the terrorist threat to the USA and leave the 
internal arrangement to the will of Afghan political authorities. The only American request was 
and has been that this regime shall not be openly hostile to the USA (Cf. Rubin 2004: 167). 
The Taliban regime collapsed quite quickly. However, Operation Enduring Freedom 
went on even after its collapse. On the one hand, it is an American contribution to the country’s 
stabilisation but, on the other hand, its primary US-goal was to get rid of the terrorists, their 
infrastructure and capture their leader. Yet with the current distribution of political forces in 
Afghanistan, these main American objectives are now consistent with the objectives of the 
international community to stabilise this country. At the turn of 2005, there were 18,000 
American soldiers under the American headquarters CETCOM, responsible for commanding 
troops dislocated in Afghanistan, assisted by 1,600 soldiers from other countries (Katzman 2004: 
22). Despite the numerous prognoses on the part of the world’s public, politicians, intellectuals 
and scientists, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has not become a “second Vietnam“ 
for the United States so far. For the time being, the United States has not handed its ally over to 
another country’s aggression as in 1975, when South Vietnam and its population were sacrificed 
in the name of piece.3 In regard to the advanced drug production and drug trade, Sean M. 
Maloney remarked pertinently that in case of Enduring Freedom, it is an operation similar to the 
American engagement in Columbia (Maloney 2005: 21). In respect to the local situation, it is hard 
                                                 
3 The thing is that the USA in 1975 did not react adequately to the outbreak of another offensive of North Vietnam, 
which was a flagrant violation of peace agreements signed in 1973 in Paris. Following that, North Vietnam stopped 
the aggression and the United States significantly reduced its military presence in South Vietnam. After the 
reappearance of North-Vietnamese offensive in 1975, the United States no longer defended South Vietnam, in 
contradiction with its obligations.    
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to exclude a possibility of establishing of an opposition force which will try to reverse the 
stabilisation process as well as the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
The North-Atlantic Alliance responded to the September 11 terrorist attacks very 
promptly. As early as September 12, 2001, they passed a provisional resolution to activate Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty. After the foreign origin of the attacks had been proved, the 
provisional resolution was approved. On October 8, 2001, as a part of NATO Allies’ response, 
five aircrafts of early warning (AWACS) were transferred to the USA in order to assist with 
counter-terrorism operations. Besides American soldiers, also soldiers from Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Turkey and Great Britain took part in it. NATO’s Standing Naval Forces 
were deployed in the total number of eight frigates and one logistic-support ship in the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Bennett 2001/2002: 6).      
The German government, which had relied on the close alliance with the United States 
throughout the whole period of the existence of FRG since 1949, was faced with a serious 
dilemma. On the one hand, it was expected to assist the American response to the direct attack 
of the US territory; on the other hand, too much of German military engagement could result in 
internal political problems in the ruling Red-Green Coalition and weaken its position among 
German general public. It is a well-known fact that a part of SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens 
opposed German participation in this operation (Harnisch – Brauner 2001). On the whole, it can 
be stated that German participation in the Operation Enduring Freedom enjoys only a partial 
support among the German public. Moreover, German peace movement protests against this 
operation on a regular basis and it calls for investing the saved financial means into a post-war 
reconstruction.4 Nevertheless, such peace activists fail to suggest how to reconstruct a country 
tormented by fights against armed gangs and terrorists destroying the civil infrastructure being 
built only with great difficulties.  
The government substantiated the deployment of German army outside German territory 
during the parliamentary discussion about a prospective German participation in Operation 
Enduring Freedom with Article 5 of Washington Treaty and Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the 
Organic Statute. The Red-Green administration expected the contingent to be sent into the area 
defined by Article 6 of Washington Treaty and further on, to the Arabian peninsula, North Africa 
                                                 
4 A similar file is available on http://www.uni-assel.de/fb5/frieden/themen/Bundeswehr/afghanistan-einsatz.html 
(situation by 06/03/2006). 
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and with the consent of the local government, also to Afghanistan.5 Despite the fact that the 
subsequent American actions evoked harsh political disputes in the social democratic party 
(SPD), as it was acknowledged by Peter Struck, the chairman of the social democratic fraction in 
Bundestag, when discussing the requirement of the German government to deploy German 
soldiers as a response to terrorist attacks, SPD reached a conclusion that the procedure 
implemented had no other alternative.6 The German Parliament granted consent to the 
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom on November 16, 2001. The German government 
was allowed to deploy in this operation up to 3,900 soldiers in the following number: troops 
protecting against consequences of the use of mass destruction weapons (up to 800 soldiers), 
medical troops (up to 250 soldiers), special forces (up to 100 soldiers), air transport (up to 500 
soldiers), navy (up to 1,800 soldiers), logistic support forces (up to 450 soldiers).7 The mandate 
for the German military engagement in the Mission Enduring Freedom has later been prolonged 
several times. At present, Germany has set aside for OEF up to 2,800 soldiers.8 
During Operation Enduring Freedom, German troops have taken part in a number of 
deployments. The operation’s general objective is to eliminate terrorists’ training bases, fight the 
terrorists, arrest them and bring them to justice and stop supporting terrorists in the operational 
area.9 As far as the number of deployed soldiers and their impact are concerned, the most 
important mission is the deploying of German navy near the African coast in the area of the Red 
Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somali coast. The size of the German contingent is fluctuating. It is 
                                                 
5 Antrag der Bundesregierung auf Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen 
Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten 
Nationen gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 des Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des 
Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolution 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen. 
Drucksache 14/7296 07. 11. 2001. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/072/1407296.pdf. 
6 Pressemitteilung Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf 
die terroristischen Angriffe gegen die USA 16. November 2001 – 0986. The document was obtained on 
http://spdfraktion.de. 
7 Antrag der Bundesregierung auf Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen 
Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten 
Nationen gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 des Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des 
Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolution 1368 2001 und 1373 2001 des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen. 
Drucksache 14/7296 07. 11. 2001. (situation by 06. 03. 2006) http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/072/1407296.pdf. 
8 Diering, Frank (2005): Rot-grüne Melancholie auf letzter Sitzung des Kabinetts. Die Welt. 03. 11. 2005.  
http://www.welt.de/data/2005/11/03/798158.html (situation by 30/11/2005) 
9 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2005): Einsätze der Bundeswehr im Ausland. Berlin, pg. 16. 
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important for the emancipation of German policy that FRG has taken command of the whole 
operation during the mission several times. In the operation, 29 frigates took turns in the 
deployment.10 There is a small basis in Djibouti for implementing the whole operation where 
there are around 30 soldiers in service.11 
In the long term, there are about 100 soldiers of special forces (Kommando Spezialkräfte 
– KSK) in Afghanistan as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Due to confidentiality, the 
details of their deployment are not known at the time of this work’s origin. Germany seems not 
to be interested in drawing attention to such a type of military engagement in order not to 
become the target of terrorist revenge; thus, it implements a rather restrictive information 
strategy. This brought up complaints among the German opposition under the Red-Green 
Coalition’s administration when they demanded to be better informed about the development of 
the German engagement in Afghanistan.12 
The German participation in the fight against international terrorism included also 
dislocation of troops intended to prevent consequences of mass destruction weapons in Kuwait 
in the period from February 10, 2002 to July 4, 2003. Altogether, there were 59 soldiers equipped 
with six radiation reconnaissance Fuchs vehicles. Another 200 soldiers were prepared. By March 
13, 2002, the German forces had been increased by 200 soldiers. The aim of this mission was to 
help Kuwait in case of a terrorist attack by mass destruction weapons or using these weapons by 
Iraq. After the Persian Gulf War broke out, German soldiers carried out analyses of Iraqi rockets 
that hit Kuwait’s territory (Wagener 2004: 9).   
On October 26, 2001, Germany took part in an operation conducted by North-Atlantic 
Treaty called „Active Endeavour“, whose aim was to protect Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, the 
operation started already on October 6, 2001, when the Coalition Standing Naval Force launched 
an operation in this area and thus supported the US efforts to wage war against international 
terrorism (Cesaretti 2005). In this regard, it is necessary to point out that the attack of the USA 
and Allies against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan started a day later, on October 7. In 
February 2003, Operation Active Endeavour was expanded to Western Mediterranean as well. 
From that moment until May 2004, the Coalition’s maritime patrols provided, besides security 
                                                 
10 This number shows that some German frigates have taken part in the deployment at African coast several times. 
11 Antworten auf häufig gestellte Fragen zur Marine am Horn von Afrika. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/ 
C1256F1D0022A5C2/CurrentBaseLink/W26BMBFU307INFODE  (situation by 06/03/2006). 
12 Leersch, Hans-Jürgen: KSK-Soldaten direkt gegen Al Qaida? Die Welt 04.11.2002. http://www.welt.de/data/ 
2002/11/04/454441.html?prx=1 (situation by 30/11/2005). 
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guard of the operational area, also escort of merchant ships through the Strait of Gibraltar. In 
March 16, 2004, the operational area was extended to the whole Mediterranean, as a part of 
accepting a greater responsibility by NATO in the fight against terrorism.13 The number of 
German deployed soldiers fluctuated around 250.14 The whole operation is a typical example of 
multinational efforts to defeat international terrorism based on North-Atlantic Alliance. During 
the whole Active Endeavour, 69,000 ships were inspected, 95 checked and 488 peace escorts 
provided through the Strait of Gibraltar by September 2002. When evaluating the whole profile 
of this mission, it is necessary to point out that it is a primarily non-combat operation that deters 
the terrorists and their partners, controls strategically important points in the Mediterranean, 
provides safe escort through the Strait of Gibraltar and develops co-operation within the 
programme of a Mediterranean dialogue. On the whole, the operation is regarded as a significant 
contribution of NATO to fight terrorism (Cesaretti 2005).      
In the Operation „Eagle Assist“, 50 German soldiers took part in patrolling the US 
airspace. The operation finished on May 16, 2002. German transport capacities were also used 
during the fight against international terrorism in favour of American troops. Moreover, German 
troops took over the guard of 56 American military facilities with FRG (Wagener 2004: 10).   
The total number of soldiers deployed in military operations aimed at fighting 
international terrorism has always been smaller than the total number approved by Bundestag. 
Moreover, German participation in these operations has gradually been declining from 3,900 
soldiers in 2001, to 3,100 in 2004 and finally to 2,800 at present. In this respect, it is necessary to 
avoid inaccuracies and not to regard these numbers as factually deployed soldiers. For example, 
in autumn 2005, there were actually 340 soldiers deployed in OAF and 24 Bundeswehr soldiers in 
operation OAE.15 Furthermore, in 2001, when the German solidarity with the USA reached its 
peak, there were not deployed as many as the total number of 3,900 soldiers.     
 
4. Conclusion: End of Civilian Power?  
 The participation of FRG in operations Active Endeavour and Eagle Assist as well as the 
temporary dislocation of German troops in Kuwait are relatively well documented in available 
                                                 
13 Operation Active Endeavour. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm 
(situation by 17/03/2006). 
14 Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, Presse- und Informationszentrum (2004): Einsatzführungs-
kommando der Bundeswehr, s. 33. 
15 Der aktuelle Begriff, Nr. 67/05, 23. 09. 2005. http://www.bundestag.de/bic/analysen/index.html; (situation 
by 07/11/2005). 
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resources. It is crucial that the operations mentioned above are completely in accordance with the 
international law and they take place as a part of multinational endeavours to fight international 
terrorism. Such military missions must be viewed as assistance to avoid conflicts, as they 
complement non-combat tools. As these missions were primarily non-combat, which is true also 
about Kuwait, excessive use of military force cannot be identified in them. Fighting terrorism can 
be regarded as a policy that generally helps to support human rights in the world. On grounds of 
the well-known facts, it is possible to claim that such military operations have all attributes of 
military operations of a civilian power and German involvement in them does not contradict 
policy of civilian power, but actually follows it. 
Nevertheless, as opposed to other German military operations in the fight against 
international terrorism, German military engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom is 
characteristic of a great restriction on information release. That holds especially true for 
operations KSK in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent, also for the maritime operation near the 
African coast. While in case of other German military operations under the Red-Green 
Coalition’s administration the researcher must face a difficult problem of what resources to 
choose in the first stage of his research, in this case it is the exact opposite. There is a severe lack 
of relevant resources and there are not very many information resources independent of 
information of the governmental establishment. Furthermore, the existing information evokes 
scepticism at the first critical sight; for instance, also because it is impossible to verify the 
resources it was drawn from.   
 With the current approach towards the resources, it is hence very difficult to evaluate the 
German military engagement in the American military operation Enduring Freedom and decide 
whether this policy is compatible with civilian power policy. A civilian power uses military force 
only after exhausting all non-military tools or at least when it is absolutely evident they are 
inefficient. On the grounds of the limited available resources, one can reach the conclusion that 
this military operation has not been the case when military force is deployed before all 
possibilities of a non-military solution have been exhausted. The military solution of the problem 
was preceded by diplomatic negotiations where the Taliban refused to surrender persons 
responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks. We do not know what role in the negotiations 
was assumed by FRG. Another attribute of using military force by a civilian power is its active 
participation in looking for a non-military solution of the crisis and avoiding a conflict. From this 
point of view, it must be pointed out that the German possibilities to take an active part in the 
political process struggling for a non-military solution of the dispute were objectively very limited 
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and the available resources do not offer adequate information for a complex evaluation of the 
German policy. The key attribute of using the military force by a civilian power is the operation’s 
conformity to the international law. Here, it is more than clear that military operation Enduring 
Freedom does not contradict the international law, as it takes place under each country’s right of 
individual or collective self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of UN Chart. Furthermore, another 
attribute is focusing a military operation on defending human rights. From this point of view, 
Operation Enduring Freedom is dubious. The main aim of this operation is not to support the 
spreading of human rights but to punish terrorists and their supporters. Thus, this mission assists 
the human rights defence only indirectly and implicitly. However, in principle, it is not an 
operation aimed at suppressing human rights. Another attribute of using military force by a 
civilian power is the attempt to minimise the extent of the force adopted. Unfortunately, when 
evaluating this aspect, it must be accentuated that we do not have essential information to be able 
to evaluate the progress of the whole mission as far as committed violence is concerned. In 
military operations of Enduring Freedom, there is an apparent effort to save lives of one’s own 
soldiers, even though the restrictive information policy grants space to perform very risky actions 
the German public would otherwise find hardly plausible. The scattered available data both 
concerning this operation in general and also German military engagement do not say that the 
aim of the military actions was to save the terrorists’ lives as much as possible. On contrary, their 
beating is the main objective of the whole mission. The facts regarding collateral losses are very 
untrustworthy as well. The only certain thing is that while fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, there were many attacks on non-military targets by American soldiers and it was so 
from the very beginning of the conflict (Murphy 2002: 247). Overall studies dealing with this 
issue are conducted by non-governmental organisations, such as Human Rights Watch.16 
Nonetheless, there are no necessary sources obtainable about the participation of German 
soldiers. German involvement in OEF does not result from a unilateral policy of FRG. 
Nonetheless, available resources do not give a sufficient answer to the actual involvement in 
fighting on the part of German soldiers, especially in relation to their deployment in Afghanistan.  
 Out of these partial conclusions accomplished upon insufficient resources, it is possible 
to reach a preliminary conclusion that a priori, German participation in the military operation 
Enduring Freedom does not necessarily contradict the attributes of a military operation by a 
civilian power. The main issue of the whole mission as far as requirements on the use of military 
force of civilian power are concerned is the extent of violence committed by German soldiers, 
                                                 
16 Human Rights Watch (2004): Enduring Freedom. Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, March, N. 16. 
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which cannot be evaluated yet. Therefore, we do not know if Germany endeavours, in carrying 
out its military operations, especially in Afghanistan, to minimise its opponent’s losses or not and 
how the lives of non-combatants are saved. Generally speaking, it can be pointed out that 
the available resources do not allow an authoritative answer to the question about the 
compatibility of German military engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom with a 
policy expected from a civilian power. This conclusion is true especially for the part of OEF 
taking place in Afghanistan. The available data only show that German participation in OEF may 
not contradict the policy of civilian power. However, the participation in further military 
operations mentioned above, as a part of the war against terrorism, does not contradict the policy 
of civilian power, especially according to the resources we have today.      
 
Literature 
Abraham, Nabeel (2005): From Baghdad to New York: Young Muslims on War and Terrorism. The Muslim World, No. 4, 
pp. 587 – 599. 
Ash, Timothy Garton (1994): Germanys Choice. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August), pp. 65 – 81. 
Baraki, Martin (2003): Afghanistan zwei Jahre nach Petersberg. Eine Bestandsaufnahme. Blätter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik, No. 12, pp. 1463 – 1471. 
Bureš, Oldřich (2003): Mírové operace OSN v postbipolárním světě – méně znamená více. Mezinárodní vztahy, č. 3, s. 24 – 43. 
Busse, Nikolas (2003): Struggling with the Realities of World Politics: Transatlantic Relations Under Schröder and Fischer. German 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue. A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German foreign Policy, Vol. 4, No. 9, pp. 13 – 15. 
Cesaretti, Roberto (2005): Zápas s terorismem ve Středozemním moři. NATO-review, podzim, on-line: 
(http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/czech/art4_pr.html). 
Elias, Norbert (1997a): Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Erster Band, 
Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes. Amsterdam. 
Elias, Norbert (1997b): Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, 
Wandlungen der Gesellschaft Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation/ Norbert Elias. Amsterdam.  
Feickert, Andrew (2005): U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and 
Colombia. CRS Report for Congress. 
Frenkler, Ulf – Harnisch, Sebastian – Kirste, Knut – Maull, Hanns W. – Wallraf, Wolfram (1997): Deutsche, 
amerikanische und japanische Außenpolitikstrategien 1985-1995. Ein vergleichende Untersuchung zu 
Zivilisierungsprozessen in der Triade. Schlussbericht und Ergebnisse. Universität Trier.  
Graf, Wilfried (1996): Zivilisierung der Zivilisation – Fragmente zur Komposition einer komplexen Theorie des globalen 
Zivilisationsprozesses. In: Vogt, Wolfgang R. (ed.): Frieden durch Zivilisierung? Münster, pp. 238 – 270.  
Harnisch, Sebastian – Brauner, Wolfgang (2001): The German Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: A shift in the 
Domestic Political Debate and Party Politics? German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, No. 5, on-line: 
http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue5.pdf  
Harnisch, Sebastian (1997a): After Hegemony – Do the New Civilian Powers survive their creator? Working Paper. Universität 
Trier. 
Středoevropské politické studie  roč. VIII, č. 2-3, s. 122-135 
Central European Political Studies Review  Vol. VIII, Number 2-3, pp. 122-135 
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity  ISSN 1212-7817 
 
 
 134 
Harnisch, Sebastian (1997b): Der Zivilmachtansatz ist keine Schönwettertheorie. Überlegungen zur methodischen und theoretischen 
Verortung. Working Paper. Universität Trier. 
Heck, Charles, B. (2003): The “Poison” in the Relations Between Berlin and Washington. German Foreign Policy in Dialogue. A 
Quarterly E-Newsletter on German foreign Policy, Vol. 4, No. 9, pp. 5 - 12. 
Katzman, Kenneth (2004): Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress. 
König, Helmut (1966): Zivilisation und Barbarei – Über eine blinde Stelle der Zivilisationstheorie. In: Vogt, Wolfgang R. (ed.): 
Frieden durch Zivilisierung? Münster, pp. 146 – 155. 
Kirste, Knut (1998): Rollentheorie und Außenpolitikanalyse. Die USA und Deutschland als Zivilmächte. Frankfurt am Main. 
Kříž, Zdeněk (2003): Německá bezpečnostní politika v militární dimenzi. Politické souvislosti reformy Bundeswehru. Vojenská 
akademie v Brně. 
Maloney, Sean M. (2005): Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment. Parameters, No. 3, pp. 21 – 32. 
Marten, Kimberly Zisk (2002): Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan. The Washington 
Quarterly, Winter, pp. 35 – 52.  
Maull, Hanns, W. (1992): Zivilmacht: Die Konzeption und ihre sicherheitspolitische Relevanz. In: Heydrich, Wolfgang (Hrsg.): 
Sicherheitspolitik Deutschland: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, Instrumente. Baden-Baden, pp. 771 – 786. 
Maull, Hanns, W. (1993): Civilian Power: The Concept and its Relevance for Security Issues. In: Babic, Lidija – 
Huldt, Bo: Mapping the Unknown. Towards a New World Order. London, s. 115 – 131. 
Maull Hanns W. (1999): Germany and Use of force: Still a Civilian Power? Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen 
Politik, No. 2. 
Maull, Hanns, W (2000): Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power? Survival, No. 2, Summer, pp. 56 – 80. 
Maull, Hanns W. (2003): Editorial: Red-Green Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the Second Term: International Standing Turned 
Around? German Foreign Policy in Dialogue. A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German foreign Policy, Vol.4, No. 9, 
pp. 1 – 4. 
Monaco, Annalisa (2005): Re-thinking Nato’s engagement in Afghanistan. European Security Review, No. 27, pp. 1 – 3. 
Murphy, Sean D. (2002): Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law. The American Journal of 
International Law, No. 1, pp. 237 – 255.   
Nichols, Thomas M. (2005): Anarchy and Order in the New Age of Prevention. World Policy Journal, No. 3, pp. 1 – 23. 
Philippi, Nina (1997): Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze al außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland. 
Frankfurt am Main. 
Porter, Wayne (2004): Applying the Balkan Model to Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East as a Means of 
Countering Transnational Instability. Conflict Resolution Journal, Spring, pp. 65 – 72. 
Rittberger, Volker – Schimmelfenning, Frank (1997): German Foreign Policy After Unification. A Re-Examination of Realist 
Prognoses. Tübingen. 
Rittberger, Volker (1999): Deutschlands Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung. Zur Anwendbarkeit theoretischer Modelle der 
Außenpolitik: Machtstaat, Handelsstaat oder Zivilstaat? In: Bergem, Wolfgang – Ronge, Volker – Weißeno, 
Georg (Hrsg.): Friedenspolitik in und für Europa. Opladen, pp. 83 – 110. 
Rubin, Barnett R. (2004): (Re)Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy. Current History, April, pp. 165 – 170. 
Schleyová, Nicole – Busseová, Sabine (2003): Války USA. Kronika agresivního národa. Praha. 
Schmidt, Peter (2005): Německo a Amerika: Quo vadis? Perspektivy německo-amerických vztahů. Mezinárodní politika, č. 5, s. 
6 – 8. 
Středoevropské politické studie  roč. VIII, č. 2-3, s. 122-135 
Central European Political Studies Review  Vol. VIII, Number 2-3, pp. 122-135 
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity  ISSN 1212-7817 
 
 
 135 
Sherbiny, Naiem A. (2005): America: A View from Egypt. Social Research, Winter, No. 4, pp. 831 – 856. 
Vogt, Wolfgang R. (1996): Zivilisierung und Frieden – Entwurf einer kritisch-reflexiven Friedenstheorie. In: Vogt, Wolfgang R. 
(ed.): Frieden durch Zivilisierung? Münster, pp. 91 – 135. 
Wagener, Martin (2004): Auf dem Weg zu einer „normalen“ Macht? Die Entsendung deutscher Streiträfte in der Ära Schröder. 
Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, No. 8. Universität Trier. 
Waltz, Kenneth W. (1993): The Emerging structure of International Security. International Security. Fall, pp. 44 – 79. 
Weinberger, Naomi (2002): Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan. Journal of 
International Affairs, No. 2, pp. 245 – 274. 
Zůna, Jaromír (2002): NATO operace na podporu míru. Vojenská akademie v Brně.  
 
